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FIRST AMENDMENT 
Christmas Wiihout Creches? 
Can Private Naiivity Scenes Be Banned from Public Land? 
by Neal Devins 
Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale 
ISSUES 
v. 
McCreary 
(Docket No. 84-277) 
Argued FebntaT)•20,1985 
Scarsdale v. Afc(.'reary broadly questions the freedom 
of religious expression. Specifically at issue is the au-
tltority of local government to prohibit privately-spon-
sored nativity scene displays on public lands. 
Last term, in Lynch v. Dotmelly (I 04 S. Ct. 1355 
( 1984); Preview, 1983-84 term, pp. 9-1 0), the Court 
found Pawtucket, Rhode Island's practice of sponsoring 
a nativity scene display on private land to be constitu-
tional. Lynch, however, left unaddressed a number of 
issues concerning the religion and speech clauses of the 
First Amendment; the Scarsdale case will address many 
of these issues. 
Of primary interest, Scarsdale presents the Court 
with an opportunity to define what factors a munici-
pality can take into account in limiting protected ex-
pression. In Scarsdale, the village denied a citizen's group 
request to display a creche because it believed that such a 
display could divide the city on religious grounds. Al-
though Lynch suggests that a city-supported nativity dis-
play is not state support of religion, the. Court expres.sed 
no opinion on a municipality's authonty to determme, 
for itself, the significance of approving the public dis-
play of a creche. Related to this, Scarsdale states the 
possibility that, in some jurisdictions, public nativi~y 
scene displays may impermissibly involve the state m 
promoting religion. Finally, the Scarsdale case presents 
the Court with another opportunity to define the con-
tours of state authority over protected expression in 
public forums. 
FACTS 
In 1981, the Village of Scarsdale, New York, for the 
first time in approximately twenty-five years, denied a 
request by the creche committee, a private citizens' 
group, to display a nativity scene at Boniface Circle-a 
Neal Devins is an attomey specializing i11 civil rights law, 
1121 Vemwntllvenue, NW, Washington, DC 20425; tele-
phone (202) 376-8372. 
Issue No. 12 
publil: park. Prior to that, groups such as the B'n~i B'ri~h 
antidefamation League argued that the pubhcly-dls-
played creche was offensive because it suggested that th.e 
village favored the Christian religion over other reli-
gions. This controversy had, in 1976, led a group of 
local clergy, "in keeping with our respect for one anoth-
er's beliefs," to offer their grounds as sites for the dis-
play. 
Following the city's denial of their request, the creche 
committee brought suit in federal district court. The 
court analogized the Scarsdale situation to the facts be-
fore the Supreme Court when it ruled, in Widmar v. 
Vincent (454 U.S. 263 (1981)) that state universities can-
not deny student religious groups access to uni~ersit'y 
facilities. The district court concluded that the v1llage s 
action could be upheld only if the public display violated 
the Establishment Clause. Otherwise, the court con-
cluded that the committee's First Amendment freedom 
of speech right of equal access to.~ pu.blic forum ~vas 
impermissibly limited by the mumCJpahty. Concludmg 
that the display would violate the Establishment Clause, 
the court approved Scarsdale's decision. . . 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, pomtmg to 
the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Lynch v. Donnelly 
overruled the district court. In light of Lynch, the appel-
late court concluded that the city could not justify its 
prohibition. The fact that the Scarsdale nativity scene 
was not part of some larger Christmas display, .unlike 
the Pawtucket display at issue in Lynch, was cons1dered 
irrelevant by the Second Circuit. The appellate court 
urged that: "The Supreme Court did not decide the 
Pawtucket case based upon the physical context within 
which the display of the creche was situated, rather, the 
Court consistently referred to 'the creche in the context 
of the Christmas season,' or the 'Christmas Holiday Sea-
son. 
... 
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Scarsdale ar-
gues that the appellate court erroneously equated: 1) a 
nativity scene affixed to public land with speakers who 
make use of a public forum and then depart, and 2) 
Establishment Clause concerns of a publicly-funded na-
tivity scene displayed in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, with a 
public display of a nativity scene in Scarsdale, New York. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The Scarsdale decision-in more ways than one-will 
be of immediate and visible significance. This past 
Christmas season produced many nativity scene contra-
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versies. In Dearborn, Michigan, a federaljudge prohib-
ited a city-sponsored nativity scene display on public 
land (only to have the city sell that land and the display 
to private owners not affected by First Amendment 
laws). In Chicago and New York City, nativity displays 
were erected, removed and then put up again and in 
Washington, D.C., the Department of Interior was em-
broiled in a controversy over its decision to include a 
nativity scene in its annual Christmas time display. 
These events indicate that the Scarsdale case will greatly 
affect local decisionmakers confronted either with the 
pro!>pect of sponsoring their own creche or approving 
the public display of a privately-funded nativity scene. 
The village initially argues that since plaintiffs need 
not be present at the proposed display, the question of 
"whose speech is it" is raised. Scarsdale also offers an 
alternative First Amendment speech argument-that a 
"municipal government is entitled, and may be obliged, 
to refrain from causing its citizens to support, or appear 
to support, moral or religious or otherwise partisan 
ideas that a substamial number of these people conscien-
tiously oppose." Contrasting Widmar v. Vincent, the vil-
lage posits that: "The Missouri University meeting place 
was a 'forum generally open' for student speakers; 
Scarsdale's parks have never supplied a 'forum generally 
open' for statutes or symbols or other unattended dis-
plays of partisan or sectarian positions." According to 
Scarsdale, this is a distinction of great significance, for 
alternative private sites are available to the creche com-
mittee-permitting the speaker an opportunity to com-
municate effectively without disrupting the village's 
desire to appear "nonpartisan" on religious matters. 
In addition to questioning the scope of the commit-
tee's speech rights, the village argues that, because of 
factual distinctions, Lynch v. Donnelly is not dispositive of 
the First Amendment religion clause issue central to this 
argument. Instead, it alleges that "actual and severe" 
divisiveness (not merely the potential of divisiveness) has 
characterized the Scarsdale creche controversy. It also 
notes that the creche could be displayed in isolation and 
on public land-not as a part of a seasonal display lo-
cated in a privately-owned park and featuring such secu-
lar symbols as candystriped poles, animal figures and 
colored lights. 
The creche committee, placing great emphasis on 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Widmar v. Vincent and 
Lynch v. Donnelly, seeks to rebut both of these arguments. 
After noting that First Amendment speech protections 
extend to such detached symbols as commercial bill-
boards (Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 480 
(1981)) and that Scarsdale has no statutes or ordinances 
limiting public displays of such symbols, the committee 
argues that the village is bound by the Supreme Court's 
admonition in Widmtlr that: "The Constitution forbids a 
state to enforce certain exclusions from a forum gener-
ally open to the public even if it was not requested to 
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create the forum in the first place." (454 U.S. at 267-68) 
Relying on Widmar, the committee claims that Scar-
sdale's prohibition can be supported only if it is the least 
restrictive means available to serve some compelling 
state interest. 
The creche committee, pointing to the Lynch case, 
claims that the village cannot meet this burden. Arguing 
that Lynch does not support the village's factual distinc-
tions, the committee notes a Supreme Court ruling that: 
"The state's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and 
strife may not be accomplished by regulating religious 
speech and political association." (McDtmiel v. Paty, 435 
U.S. 618,640 (1978)) It claims that Scarsdale's prohibi-
tion of the display is unrelated to any legitimate state 
interest. "In contrast," the committee asserts, "by per-
mitting the temporary display of a privately-owned na-
tivity scene in an open public forum, accompanied by a 
sign identifying the sponsor, the village does not force 
anyone actually or apparently to affirm the truth of the 
display's message." 
If the creche committee ultimately prevails in this 
case, political and religious groups will probably make 
increasing use of public displays at city parks and other 
such sites as a mechanism to make t!. •ir positions felt in 
the community at large. If Scarsdale prevails, munici-
palities will have authority to restrict "divisive" symbols. 
Were this to occur, local governments, by determining 
what is "divisive," will have substantial authority to regu-
late protected speech. 
The Scarsdale case will also have substantial impact on 
how broadly Supreme Court precedents should be read. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, if broadly read, suggests that public 
nativity scene displays pose no Establishment Clause 
problems. In Scarsdale, the village argues that divisive-
ness surrounding the creche committee proposal distin-
guishes its case from Lynch. If this argument is validated, 
local, state and federal government will be reminded of 
the potentially fact-specific nature of Supreme Court 
rulings. Were government to narrowly read Supreme 
Court decisions, it may pay less attention to those rulings 
in drafting legislation or devising regulations. 
Finally, the Scant/ale case may prove important to 
understanding the swpe of government authority in 
regulating public forums. The village of Scarsdale had 
no set procedures goyerning either the approval of pub-
lic displays or time, place, or manner of restrictions on 
such displays. If the village loses this case, one contribut-
ing factor might be the absence of such guidelines. One 
effect of such a ruling might be that municipalities 
throughout the nation may establish such rules and 
regulations governing public displays. 
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ARGUMENTS 
For the Village of Scarsdale (Couusel of Record, Alaroin E. 
Frankel, 919 Third Aveuue, New York, NY 10022: teleplwne 
(212) 715-9100) 
I. Since the creche committee could accomplish its pur-
pose through alternative means, the village is not 
obligated to provide public sites for sectarian or parti-
san displays. Related to this proposition, Scarsdale 
notes the possible divisiveness of such displays and 
asserts the.committee's expression rights are limited, 
since public displays are materially distinguishable 
from vocal speech. 
2. Concern for the appearance of sponsoring religion 
and fear of divisiveness establish a compelling state 
interest sufficient to justify denying the request here 
to display the creche. 
3. The facts of last term's creche case, Lynch v. Donnelly, 
are distinguishable from the situation faced in Scars-
dale, and thus do not compel the village to approve 
public displays of privately-owned nativity scenes. 
Issue No. 12 
For the Scarsdale Creche Committee (CoullSel of Record, 
1Harvin Schwartz, 125 Broad Street, New York, NY 10004; 
telephone (212) 558-4000) 
I. Since Boniface Circle is a traditional public forum, 
Scarsdale must demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est to support its denial of the creche committee 
request. 
2. The village's approval of the privately-owned creche 
does not constitute the sort of government support of 
religion necessary to establish compelling state inter-
est sufficient to support its actions. 
3. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit the tem-
porary display of a privately-sponsored creche in a 
public park at Christmas. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of the Village of Scarsdale 
The American Civil Liberties Union and Antidefa-
mation League of B'nai B'rith. 
In Support of the Creche Committee 
The United States, Catholic League for Religious 
and Civil Rights. 
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